Definitions or interpretation clauses

Vande Matram! Interpretation of Statute is very important skill which every law professional must possess. Hence it is incorporated in the degree course of law. Let’s discuss how are definitions useful in interpretation of statute and its construction?

Definitions or interpretation clauses:

It is common to find in statutes “definitions” of certain words and expressions used elsewhere in the body of the statute. The object of such a definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing all the subject-matter to which the word or expression so defined is intended to apply. A definition section may borrow definitions from an earlier Act and definitions so borrowed need not be found in the definition section but in some provisions of the earlier Act. The definition of the words given must be construed in the popular sense. Internal aid to construction is important for interpretation.

The definition section may itself be ambiguous and may have to be interpreted in the light of the other provisions of the Act and having regard to the ordinary connotation of the word defined. A definition is not to be read in isolation. It must be read in the context of the phrase which it defines, realising that the function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to a word or a phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain but not to contradict or supplement it altogether.

In construing a provision of law as to its mandatory nature, the intention of the legislature and the consequences that would flow from the construction thereof one way or the other have to be kept in view. Definitions do not take away the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, but as used:

(i) to extend the meaning of a word to include or cover something, which would not normally be covered or included; and

(ii) to interpret ambiguous words and words which are not plain or clear.

The definition must ordinarily determine the application of the word or phrase defined; but the definition itself must first be interpreted before it is applied. When the definition of a word gives it an extended meaning, the word is not to be interpreted by its extended meaning every time it is used, for the meaning ultimately depends on the context; and a definition clause does not, ordinarily enlarge the scope of the Act.

A court should not lay down a rigid definition and crystallize the law, when the legislature, in its wisdom has not done so. It is ordinarily unsafe to seek the meaning of words used in an Act, in the definition clause of other statutes even when enacted by the same legislature; but where a word or phrase used in an Act, is used in another Act which is in pari material and the word is not defined in that other Act, then the word may be given the meaning given in the first Act.

Definitions in an Act are to be applied only when there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context, and this is so even if such a qualifying provision is not expressly stated by the legislature. It goes without saying that interpretation of a word or expression must depend on the text and the context. The resort to the word ‘includes’ by the legislature often shows the intention of the legislature that it wanted to give extensive and enlarged meaning to such expression. Sometimes, however, the context may suggest that word ‘includes’ may have been designed to mean ‘means’. The setting, context and object of an enactment may provide sufficient guidance for interpretation of the word ‘includes’ for the purposes of such enactment.

The words ‘that is to say’ are not words of restriction. They are words of illustration, and the instances that follow operate as a guide for interpretation.

If the words ‘means’ or ‘means and includes’ are used it affords a exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must inevitably be attached to those words or expressions. If the word ‘denotes’ is used it has the same significance as ‘includes’.

If the word ‘deemed to be’ is used it creates a fiction and a thing is treated to be that which in fact it is not.

If a special definition of a word or phrase is set out in an Act, the meaning of this word or phrase as given in such definition should normally be adopted in the interpretation of the statute. In the absence of such a definition, the General Clauses Act, 1897 which enacted the statute should be referred to. If the word is not defined there also, the rules of interpretation would come into play.

Judgments:

Dilworth v. Stamps Commissioners 1899 AC 99 : (1895-99) All ER Rep Ext 1576 (PC)

The following observations of Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Stamps Commissioners, in the context of use of “include” as a word of extension has guided this Court in numerous cases: “... But the word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to ‘mean and include’, and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.”

South Gujarat Tiles Manufacturers Assn. V. State of Gujarat, (1976) 4 SCC 601 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 15

The meaning of the said expression has been considered by a three Judge Bench of this Court in South Gujarat Tiles Manufacturers Assn. V. State of Gujarat, wherein this Court has observed: “Now it is true that ‘includes’ is generally used as a word of extension, but the meaning of a word or phrase is extended when it is said to include things that would not properly fall within its ordinary connotation.”

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