Difference between Judgement and Decree

Difference between Judgement and Decree

Judgement	Decree
A judgement is based upon facts.	A decree is based upon judgement.
Judgment is made prior to decree.	Decree always follows a judgement.
A judgement contains facts of the case, the issues involved, the evidence brought by the parties, finding on issues (based on evidence and arguments).	A decree contains the outcome of the suit and conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to the issues in dispute in the suit.
The definition of the word judgement given in section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not include the word ‘formal’.	The definition of the word decree given in section 2(2) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 includes the word ‘formal’.
Judgement has no types.	A decree is divided into three types.
Judgement may result in a preliminary decree or a final decree or an order by itself, the judgement is always final.	The decree may be a preliminary or final or partly preliminary and partly final.
Judgement leads to the final disposal of the suit after the decree is drawn up.	After passing the decree, the suit stands disposed of since the rights of the parties are finally determined by the court.
Judgement means statement given by a Judge of the grounds of decree or order.	Decree is an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties with regards to all or any of the matter in the controversy.
It is not necessary that there should be a formal expression of order in the judgement.	It is necessary that there must be formal expression of the decree.
Judgement states preciously the relief granted.	Decree must determinate the rights of the parties
Judgment may be passed in civil suits as well as in criminal cases.	Decree is passed in a civil suit.
Judgment is not capable of execution.	Decree is capable of execution.

 

Further Reading:

Section 2. Definitions.

Section 33. Judgment and decree.

Decree

Judgment

Reference: 

1) https://blog.ipleaders.in/judgement-and-decree-under-cpc/

2) https://bnblegal.com/article/decree-judgment-and-order-under-code-of-civil-procedure-1908/

=================

Myself Rohini and I am an engineer and pursuing my Law degree. Reading, Blogging, Drawing and crafting are my hobbies. In my channel I am sharing videos about drawing, crafting, art and law as I am studying. Please subscribe to my channel and share this video. Also on my blogs I am sharing general knowledge, law notes, study material, vocabulary, bhajans, lokgits, moral stories, shayary, poems, stories, and much more which everyone should check.

=================

Please visit all my profiles and follow me there as well as share this with everyone.

 

My YouTube Channel:

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4omGoxEhAT6KEd-8LvbZsA

Visit my blogs

allinoneguidematerial.blogspot.com

gyankadeep.blogspot.com

lokgitbhajanevamkahaniya.blogspot.com

notesdynamo.blogspot.com

https://funwithlanguages123.blogspot.com

My Telegram Channel

https://t.me/onlineaddaforall

https://t.me/readingandstudy

https://t.me/studymaterial1982

Twitter Handle

https://twitter.com/rohinigilada2

My Facebook Page

https://www.facebook.com/Know-India-with-me-2472515829642325

 

Power to pronounce judgment written by judge's predecessor: O20 R2

Code of Civil Procedure

2. Power to pronounce judgment written by judge's predecessor.—¹[A Judge shall] pronounce a judgment written, but not pronounced, by his predecessor.

Note: 1. Subs. by Act 104 of 1976, s. 70 for “A Judge may” (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

Part in red is reproduced as it is from the bare act.

Code of Civil Procedure

Rule 2 of Order XX of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides a judge with the right to pronounce the judgement which is already written but is not pronounced by his predecessor.

Further Reading:

Judgment

Order XX Rule 2: Power to pronounce judgment written by Judge’s predecessor.

Reference: 

1) https://blog.ipleaders.in/judgement-and-decree-under-cpc/

Agreement of parties as to issues to be tried: Form 1 Appendix H

Code of Civil Procedure

Appendix H: Miscellaneous 

Form No. 1: AGREEMENT OF PARTIES AS TO ISSUES TO BE TRIED: (O. 14, r. 6.)

(Title)

WHEREAS we, the parties in the above suit, are agreed as to the question of fact [or of law] to be decided between us and the point at issue between us is whether a claim founded on a bond, dated the day .......... of ……………………… 20… and filed as Exhibit ……………………….. in the said suit, is or is not beyond the statute of limitation (or state the point at issue whatever it may be):

We therefore severally bind ourselves that, upon the finding of the Court in the negative [or affirmative] of such issue, ……………………. will pay to the said ………….. the sum of Rupees…………………(or such sum as the Court shall hold to be due thereon), and I, the said ………………, will accept the said sum of Rupees ……………….. (or such sum as the Court shall hold to be due) in full satisfaction of my claim on the bond aforesaid [or that upon such finding I, the said………………….., will do or abstain from doing, etc., etc.]

Plaintiff.

Defendant.

Witnesses—

1.

2.

Dated the …… day of ……………………20……

______

Code of Civil Procedure

Who may be joined as plaintiffs: O1 R1

 Code of Civil Procedure

THE FIRST SCHEDULE

ORDER I: Parties to Suits

¹[1. Who may be joined as plaintiffs.—All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where—

(a) any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and

(b) if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise.]

Note 1: 1. Subs. by Act 104 of 1976, s. 52, for rule 1 and 3 respectively (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

 

Code of Civil Procedure

THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1976

Code of Civil Procedure

ANNEXURE

THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1976

(104 OF 1976)

* * * * *

CHAPTER V

REPEAL AND SAVINGS

97. Repeal and savings.—(1) Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of this Act shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act, stand repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding that the provisions of this Act have come into force or the repeal under sub-section (1) has taken effect, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897),—

(a) the amendment made to clause (2) of section 2 of the principal Act by section 3 of this Act shall not affect any appeal against the determination of any such question as is referred to in section 47 and every such appeal shall be dealt with as if the said section 3 had not come into force;

(b) the provisions of section 20 of the principal Act, as amended by section 7 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any suit pending immediately before the commencement of the said section 7; and every such suit shall be tried as if the said section 7 had not come into force;

(c) the provisions of section 21 of the principal Act, as amended by section 8 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any suit pending immediately before the commencement of the said section 8; and every such suit shall be tried as if the said section 8 had not come into force;

(d) the provisions of section 25 of the principal Act, as substituted by section 11 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any suit, appeal or other proceeding wherein any report has been made under the provisions of section 25 before the commencement of the said section 11; and every such suit, appeal or other proceeding shall be dealt with as if the said section 11 had not come into force;

(e) the provisions of section 34 of the principal Act, as amended by section 13 of this Act, shall not affect the rate at which interest may be allowed on a decree in any suit instituted before the commencement of the said section 13 and interest on a decree passed in such suit shall be ordered in accordance with the provisions of section 34 as they stood before the commencement of the said section 13 as if the said section 13 had not come into force;

(f) the provisions of section 35A of the principal Act, as amended by section 14 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any proceedings for revision, pending immediately before the commencement of the said section 14 and every such proceedings shall be dealt with and disposed of as if the said section 14 had not come into force;

(g) the provisions of section 60 of the principal Act, as amended by section 23 of this Act, shall not apply to any attachment made before the commencement of the said section 23;

(h) the amendment of section 80 of the principal Act by section 27 of this Act shall not apply to or affect any suit instituted before the commencement of the said section 27; and every such suit shall be dealt with as if section 80 had not been amended by the said section 27;

(i) the provisions of section 82 of the principal Act, as amended by section 28 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any decree passed against the Union of India or a State or, as the case may be, a public officer, before the commencement of the said section 28 or to the execution of any such decree; and every such decree or execution shall be dealt with as if the said section 28 had not come into force;

(j) the provisions of section 91 of the principal Act, as amended by section, 30 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any suit, appeal or proceeding instituted or filed before the commencement of the said section 30; and every such suit, appeal or proceeding shall be disposed of as if the said section 30 had not come into force;

(k) the provisions of section 92 of the principal Act, as amended by section 31 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any suit, appeal or proceeding instituted or filed before the commencement of the said section 31; and every such suit, appeal or proceeding shall be disposed of as if the said section 31 had not come into force;

(l) the provisions of section 96 of the principal Act, as amended by section 33 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any appeal against the decree passed in any suit instituted before the commencement of the said section 33; and every such appeal shall be dealt with as if the said section 33 had not come into force;

(m) the provisions of section 100 of the principal Act, as substituted by section 37 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any appeal from an appellate decree or order which had been admitted, before the commencement of the said section 37, after hearing under rule 11 of Order XLI; and every such admitted appeal shall be dealt with as if the said section 37 had not come into force;

(n) section 100A, as inserted in the principal Act, by section 38 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any appeal against the decision of a single Judge of a High Court under any Letter Patent which had been admitted before the commencement of the said section 38; and every such admitted appeal shall be disposed of as if the said section 38 had not come into force;

(o) the amendment of section 115 of the principal Act, by section 43 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any proceeding for revision which had been admitted, after preliminary hearing, before the commencement of the said section 43; and every such proceeding for revision shall be disposed of as if the said section 43 had not come into force;

(p) the provisions of section 141 of the principal Act, as amended by section 47 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any proceedings which is pending immediately before the commencement of the said section 47; and every such proceeding shall be dealt with as if the said section 47 had not come into force;

(q) the provisions of rules 31, 32, 48A, 57 to 59, 90 and 97 to 103 of Order XXI of the First Schedule as amended or, as the case may be, substituted or inserted by section 72 of this Act shall not apply to or affect —

(i) any attachment subsisting immediately before the commencement of the said section 72, or

(ii) any suit instituted before such commencement under rule 63 aforesaid to establish right to attached property or under rule 103 aforesaid to establish possession, or

(iii) any proceeding to set aside the sale of any immovable property, and every such attachment, suit or proceeding shall be continued as if the said section 72 had not come into force;

(r) the provisions of rule 4 of Order XXII of the First Schedule, as substituted by section 73 of this Act shall not apply to any order of abatement made before the commencement of the said section 73;

(s) the amendment, as well as substitution, made in Order XXIII of the First Schedule by section 74 of this Act shall not apply to any suit or proceeding pending before the commencement of the said section 74;

(t) the provisions of rules 5A and 5B of Order XXVII, as inserted by section 76 of this Act, shall not apply to any suit, pending immediately before the commencement of the said section 76 against the Government or any public officer; and every such suit shall be dealt with as if the said section 76 had not come into force;

(u) the provisions of rules 1A, 2A, and 3 of Order XXVII A, as inserted or substituted, as the case may be, by section 77 of this Act shall not apply to or affect any suit which is pending before the commencement of the said section 77;

(v) rules 2A, 3A and 15 of Order XXXII of the First Schedule, as amended, or as the case may be, substituted by section 79 of this Act, shall not apply to a suit pending at the commencement of the said section 79 and every such suit shall be dealt with and disposed of as if the said section 79 had not come into force;

(w) the provisions of Order XXXIII of the First Schedule, as amended by section 81 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any suit or proceeding pending before the commencement of the said section 81 for permission to sue as a pauper; and every such suit or proceeding shall be dealt with and disposed of as if the said section 81 had not come into force;

(x) the provisions of Order XXXVII of the First Schedule, as amended by section 84 of this Act, shall not apply to any suit pending before the commencement of the said section 84: and every such suit shall be dealt with and disposed of as if the said section 84 had not come into force;

(y) the provisions of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule, as amended by section 86 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any injunction subsisting immediately before the commencement of the said section 86; and every such injunction and proceeding for dis-obedience of such injunction shall be dealt with as if the said section 86 had not come into force;

(z) the provisions of Order XLI of the First Schedule, as amended by section 87 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any appeal pending immediately before the commencement of the said section 87; and every such appeal shall be disposed of as if the said section 87 had not come into force:

(za) the provisions of Order XLII of the First Schedule, as amended by section 88 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any appeal from an appellate decree or order which had been admitted, before the commencement of the said section 88, after hearing under rule 11 of Order XLI; and every such admitted appeal shall be dealt with as if the said section 88 had not come into force;

(zb) the provisions of Order XLIII of the First Schedule, as amended by section 89 of this Act. shall not apply to any appeal against any order pending immediately before the commencement of the said section 89; and every such appeal shall be disposed of as if the said section 89 had not come into force;

(3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), the provision of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply to every suit, proceedings, appeal or application, pending at the commencement of this Act or instituted or filed after such commencement, notwithstanding the fact that the right, or cause of action, in pursuance of which such suit, proceeding, appeal or application is instituted or filed, had been acquired or had accrued before such commencement.

* * * *

Code of Civil Procedure

Judgments on Second Appeal

Code of Civil Procedure 

Section 100. Second appeal.

State Bank of India & Ors. V. S.N. Goyal

Kshitish Chandra Purkait V. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors

Judgment:

(a) In Panchu Gopal Barua V. Umesh Chandra Goswami & ors., AIR 1997 SC 1041, the Court observed that while entertaining the second appeal, the Court should not over-look the change brought about by the Amendment Act of 1976 restricting the scope of second appeal drastically and now it applies only to appeals involving substantial question of law, specifically set-out in the memorandum of appeals and formulated by the High Court. The Court, for the reasons to be recorded, may also entertain a second appeal even on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Therefore, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine- qua- non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 of the Code.

(b) In Kashibai V. Parwatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 213, the Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot ignore the statutory provisions of Section 100 of the Code and reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless the substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence.

(c) In Ram Prasad Rajak V. Nand Kumar & Bros. & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 2730, the Supreme Court held that existence of substantial question of law is a sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code and entering into the question as to whether need of the landlord was bonafide or not, was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court as the issue can be decided only by appreciating the evidence on record.

(d) In Smt. Bibhabati Devi V. Ramendra Narayan Roy & Ors., AIR 1947 PC 19, the Privy Council has provided guidelines as to what cases the second appeal can be entertained in, explaining the provisions existing prior to the amendment of 1976, observing as under:- “..... that miscarriage of justice means such a departure from the rules which permeate all judicial procedure as to make that which happen not in the proper sense of the word ‘judicial procedure’ at all. That the violation of some principles of law or procedure must be such erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition to be corrected, the finding cannot stand, or it may be the neglect of some principle of law or procedure, whose application will have the same effect. The question whether there is evidence on which the Courts could arrive at their finding, is such a question of law. ‘That the question of admissibility of evidence is a proposition of law but it must be such as to affect materially the finding. The question of the value of evidence is not sufficient reason for departure from the practice......”

(e) In Suwalal Chhogalal V. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1949) 17 ITR 269, the Apex Court held as under:- “A fact is a fact irrespective of evidence, by which it is proved. The only time a question of law can arise in such a case is when it is alleged that there is no material on which the conclusion can be based or no sufficient evidence.”

(f) In Oriental Investment Company Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 852, the Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, including Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1957 SC 49, and held that where the question is whether profit is made and shown in the name of certain intermediaries, were, in fact, profit actually earned by the assessee or the intermediaries, is a mixed question of fact and law. The Court further held that inference from facts would be a question of fact or of law according as the point for determination is one of pure fact or a “mixed question of law and fact” and that a finding on fact without evidence to support it or if based on relevant or irrelevant matters, is not unassailable.

(g) In Sir Chunnilal V. Mehta & Sons V. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, the Supreme Court for the purpose of determining the issue by the Supreme Court itself, held as under:- “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raises in the case is substantial, would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by the apex Court or by Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.”

(h) A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of State of J&K V. Thakur Ganga Singh, AIR 1960 SC 356, considered as what may be the substantial question and held that authentic interpretation of Constitutional provisions amounts to substantial question of law. However, where the substantial question of law had already been decided by the Authority which is binding on the other Courts like the judgments of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution is binding on all other Courts etc., it does not remain a substantial question of law because there remains no scope to interpret further the said provision.

(i) In Reserve Bank of India V. Ramakrishna Govind Morey, AIR 1976 SC 830, the Supreme Court held that the question whether the Trial Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently, is not a question of law or a substantial question of law and, therefore, second appeal cannot be entertained by the High Court on this ground.

(j) In Gian Dass V. Gram Panchayat, (2006) 6 SCC 271; and C.A. Sulaiman V. State Bank of Travancore, AIR 2006 SC 2848, the Apex Court held that Clause (5) to Section 100 applies only when a substantial question has already been framed and if the Court forms the opinion that some other substantial question of law also exists, the Court may frame the said issue after recording reasons for the same.

(k) In Jai Singh V. Shakuntala, AIR 2002 SC 1428, the Supreme Court held that it is permissible to interfere even on question of fact but it has to be done only under exceptional circumstances. The Court observed as under:- “While scrutiny of evidence does not stand out to be totally prohibited in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction in the second appeal and that would, in our view, be too broad a proposition and too rigid an interpretation of law not worth acceptance but that does not also clothe the superior courts within jurisdiction to intervene and interfere in any and every matter- it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extensor stands permissible it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection.”

(l) In Muthu Gounder V. Ammayee Ammal, AIR 2002 SC 2481, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to interfere with the findings of facts by the courts below and to entertain a second appeal without framing a substantial question of law.

(m) In Transmission Corporation of A.P. V. Ch. Prabhakar & Ors., (2004) 5 SCC 551, the Supreme Court held that appeal is the right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress an error of the court below. The right of appeal has been recognised by judicial decisions as a right which vests in a suitor at the time of institution of original proceedings, and it is the institution of the suit which by implication carries with it all rights of appeal. The right of appeal exists as on, and from the date of the commencement of lis and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced, such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of filing of appeal. The vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.

(n) In P. Chandrasekharan & Ors. V. S. Kanakarajan & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 669 the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that interference in second appeal is permissible only when the findings are based on misreading of evidence or are so perverse that no person of ordinary prudence could take the said view. More so, the Court must be conscious that intervention is permissible provided the case involves a substantial question of law which is altogether different from the question of law. Interpretation of a document which goes to the root of title of a party may give rise to substantial question of law.

(o) In Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti V. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 248, the Apex Court considered the scope of appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and held as under: “Section 30 of the said Act postulates an appeal directly to the High Court if a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal….. A jurisdictional question will involve a substantial question of law. A finding of fact arrived at without there being any evidence would also give rise to a substantial question of law………… A question of law would arise when the same is not dependent upon examination of evidence, which may not require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law would, however, arise when the finding is perverse in the sense that no legal evidence was brought on record or jurisdictional facts were not brought on record.”

(p) In Santosh Hazari V. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179, the Supreme Court held that: “A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case, whether a question of law is a substantial one or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis."

(q) In Sheel Chand V. Prakash Chand, AIR 1998 SC 3063, the apex Court held that question of re-appreciation of evidence and framing the substantial question as to whether the findings relating to factual matrix by the court below could vitiate due to irrelevant consideration and not under law, being question of fact cannot be framed.

(r) In Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji V. MahadevChannabasappa & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 2108, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible for the High Court to decide the Second Appeal by re-appreciating the evidence as if it was deciding the First Appeal unless it comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the court below were perverse.

(s) In Kulwant Kaur & Ors. V. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) byL.Rs. AIR 2001 SC 1273, the apex Court held that the question whether Lower Court’s finding is perverse may come within the ambit of substantial question of law. However, there must be a clear finding in the judgment of the High Court as to perversity in order to show compliance with provisions of Section 100 CPC. Thus, the Court rejected the proposition that scrutiny of evidence is totally prohibited in Second Appeal. Thus, it is evident that High Court can interfere with the finding of fact while deciding the Second Appeal provided the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse.

Code of Civil Procedure 

Section 100. Second appeal.

Kshitish Chandra Purkait V. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors

Code of Civil Procedure 

Section 100. Second appeal.

In Kshitish Chandra Purkait V. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2517, the Supreme Court observed that while deciding the second appeals, mandatory statutory requirements are seldom borne in mind and second appeals are being entertained without conforming to the above discipline. It further placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. V. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 798, wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:- “..... It is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in Sub-section (5) of Section 100. Under the proviso, the Court should be ‘satisfied’ that the case involves a substantial question of law and not a mere question of law. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be recorded by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that would be alleged at a stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded.”

Code of Civil Procedure 

Section 100. Second appeal.